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Abstract 
The law-making role of judges has always been the subject of 
much controversy. For a good many a year and especially 
during the apartheid regime, the approach to statutory 
interpretation that dominated the South African courts was the 
orthodox textual position. According to the textualists, as they 
were referred to, the position that was adopted was that 
legislation was to be interpreted within the framework of the 
words used by the legislature. The courts were not empowered 
to make any modifications, alterations or additions to the 
legislative text, as this function was solely the responsibility of 
the legislature. The paradigmatic shift in emphasis since 1994 
from a system of parliamentary sovereignty to constitutional 
supremacy changed this position significantly. The key 
consideration of statutory interpretation was that the aim and 
purpose of legislation was to be considered with the values of 
the Constitution forming the over-arching principle in the 
process of interpretation. The courts were enjoined to reconcile 
the purpose of the legislation with the provisions of the 
Constitution, and in particular, the Bill of Rights. The emerging 
view in support of the purposive or the teleological theory has 
been that judges do indeed have a law-making function in the 
process of interpretation. Since the early 1990's, it has been 
observed that the judiciary has been able to assert its influence 
on the development of the law and the emerging jurisprudence, 
as a result of the powers derived from the Constitution, and in 
particular section 39(2). The article examines the extent to 
which the judiciary can use this power in a post-democratic 
constitutional era, in South Africa, to achieve justice. From the 
repository of cases, which forms the basis of the discussion, the 
article proposes a set of factors that ought to be heeded by our 
courts in the application of section 39(2). 
Keywords 
Concretisation; parliamentary sovereignty; constitutional 
supremacy; textual interpretation; teleological interpretation; 
value-orientated approach; reading-in; reading-down; 
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1 Introduction 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa1 has had a phenomenal 
influence on South African society as a whole and the emerging 
jurisprudence in relation thereto, acting as a bridge from the notorious 
apartheid regime and leading to the new democratic constitutional 
dispensation. Over the last two decades there has been a rapid 
development of our constitutional jurisprudence, largely facilitated by the 
decisions made by the courts. In developing our jurisprudence, the courts 
have had a number of challenging decisions to consider. A few of these 
form the basis of the discussion on judicial law-making in the current 
constitutional order, and are considered here. 
Due to the oppressive history of South Africa, the public confidence in the 
judiciary was tarnished considerably and it was only with the introduction 
of the Interim Constitution2 that the judiciary's work in changing this 
perception started taking effect. However, the responsibility of the courts 
to develop a just and coherent constitutional jurisprudence and to foster 
public confidence in the judiciary does not lie solely with the judiciary. This 
duty has to be regarded as a shared responsibility amongst legal 
academics, scholars, practitioners, and ordinary citizens who must 
participate in "constructive dialogue with the courts, other persons and 
institutions about which interpretations of the Constitution will best realise 
its transformative purpose".3 
This article examines the philosophies underlying judicial reasoning as 
well as how the approach of South African courts has influenced the 
methods of interpretation that have been applied. From an analysis of the 
emerging jurisprudence as a result of the methodology applied, the aim of 
the article therefore is to establish the factors that ought to be considered 
                                            
* Annie Singh. LLB (UDW) LLM (UDW) Phd (UKZN). Lecturer, School of Law, 
University of KwaZulu-Natal. Email: singhat@ukzn.ac.za. 
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KwaZulu-Natal. Email: zbhero@werkermans.com. The authors would like to extend 
their gratitude to George Devenish, Professor Emeritus at the University of KwaZulu-
Natal for his valuable input and comments made on earlier drafts of the article. 
1 The Constitution refers to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(Constitution) unless indicated otherwise. 
2 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 (Interim Constitution). 
3 Cornell and Friedman 2002 http://bit.ly/24FjjPu. 
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by judges when exercising their powers in terms of section 39(2) of the 
Constitution.4 This forms the thrust of the article. 
2 The role of judges 
2.1 Concretising the law 
The interpretation of law by the judiciary can be deemed to be the final 
stage in the legislative process. According to the concept of concretisation, 
the process of law-making is not completed by the promulgation of 
legislation. What is required is a harmonisation of the abstract legislative 
text with the facts of the case through interpretational methods, within the 
framework of the Constitution or relevant law. What this means in effect is 
that the judiciary does in fact have a "peripheral and subordinate law-
making function".5 Devenish seems to agree with this view and suggests 
further that there is an implied 
delegation of quasi-legislative competence to the judicial arm of government. 
Consequently, the courts play a vital and unique role in developing and 
formulating the law.6 
This is largely due to the fact that there will inevitably be a certain amount 
that the legislature may have left out during the drafting of legislation. This 
is referred to as the "drafting device of ellipsis"7 and accordingly some 
established legal principles, particularly administrative and constitutional 
law principles, may be over-looked by parliament. This is when the 
delegated "quasi-legislative" powers of the judiciary would come into play.8 
It is further submitted that 
since all cases cannot be foreseen or expressed, it is necessary that when 
general decrees of law come to be applied in particular cases, there should 
be some powers vested, of defining those circumstances which (had they 
been foreseen) the legislator himself would have expressed.9 
                                            
4 Section 39(2) of the Constitution states that "when interpreting any legislation, and 
when developing the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum 
must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights". 
5  Botha Statutory Interpretation 161. 
6  Devenish Interpretation of Statutes 6. 
7  Bennion Statutory Interpretation 240. 
8  Cross Statutory Interpretation 166. 
9 Devenish Interpretation of Statutes 40. 
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In the case of Corocraft Ltd v Pan American Airways,10 Donaldson J 
explained the role of judges in the interpretation of legislation and in a 
manner consistent with the theory of "concretisation" as follows: 
In the performance of this duty the judges do not act as computers into 
which are fed statutes and the rules for construction of Statutes and from 
which issue forth the mathematically correct answer. The Interpretation of 
Statutes is a craft as much as a science and the judges, as craftsmen, select 
and apply appropriate rules as the tools of their trade. They are not 
legislators, but finishers and polishers of legislation which comes to them in 
a state requiring varying degrees of further processing. 
Indeed the above quotation succinctly sums up the role of the judge in the 
process of law-making. Due to the fact that judges are regarded as being 
representatives of the judicial system, the manner in which they execute 
their duties, particularly with regard to the interpretation and application of 
the law, has always been a subject of interest. There has certainly been 
an upsurge of interest with the advent of the new constitutional 
dispensation and in particular the introduction of section 39. The 
application of section 39 and the influence of the theories related thereto 
are dealt with in more detail hereunder.11 Nevertheless, some of the more 
popular philosophical theories on the role of judges are also relevant to the 
discussion, and a brief analysis of each is presented. 
3 Philosophical theories on the role of judges 
To fully appreciate the role of judges, an analysis of some of the more 
popular philosophical theories is useful. The article focuses on three 
contentious issues on the role of judges from influential legal philosophers. 
The first is Ronald Dworkin, who is renowned for his theory of "Law as 
Integrity". He developed an idea of "constructive interpretation" and 
contended that judges must always seek to derive the best solution in 
cases taking into consideration the legal doctrine and political structure in 
a community. In extending this theory, he created a mythical judge, 
Hercules J, who according to him always derived the correct decision, for 
which he argued there was always one best-fitting conclusion.12 This 
required an interpretation of law as a whole. Consideration has to be given 
to the entire body of law and this includes evaluating the relevant legal 
principles and theories in the process of interpretation. According to 
                                            
10 Corocraft Ltd v Pan American Airways 1973 3 (WLR) 714 732. 
11 See the discussion in 5.5 Cases impacting on policy issues. 
12 Rosenfield Law, Justice, Democracy 184. 
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Dworkin, judges should always strive to emulate Hercules J in the cases 
that they decide.13 
The legal positivists on the other hand were of the view that the 
interpretation of law was a mechanical process in which no value 
judgements or discretion are exercised by the judge, and that morals are 
completely separated from law.14 Herbert Hart, an acclaimed positivist who 
has been widely quoted in this regard, has stated that "law is not morality; 
do not let it supplant morality".15 Therefore, it was argued that the role of 
the judges is simply to derive the intention of the legislature through the 
interpretation of the text, and should have less regard to extrinsic methods 
of interpretation. As a result of focusing on the literal theory and giving 
effect to the ordinary grammatical meaning of the words, courts were able 
to give effect to harsh, unjust apartheid legislation. 
The view of the American realists may be deemed to be somewhat more 
radical. The basis of their reasoning is that judges rarely derive a 
conclusion from a consideration of legal principles but instead their 
decisions are influenced by each judge's prejudices. Legal principles, it is 
argued, are merely used to justify the biased conclusion. Therefore, it is 
their submission that law is actually made by the judges and what the law 
is, is thus decided by the presiding judge's political, economic and moral 
views.16 Judge Jerome Frank, who is also known as the enfant terrible17 of 
the realists, is convinced that the approach to the judicial process is: 
A myth – a false affirmation without complete knowledge of its falsity … 
when judges and lawyers announce that judges can never validly make law, 
they are not engaged in fooling the public; they have successfully fooled 
themselves.18 
This view is perhaps not very popular in the legal fraternity. Comparatively, 
it would seem, however, that the views held by the positivists and Dworkin 
have been more favourably received in the South African legal system. 
While prior to 1994 the court's approach was more reflective of the 
positivists' ideology that law and morality were to be regarded as separate 
concepts, this changed significantly with the introduction of the 1996 
Constitution. Post 1994, Dworkin's theory of constructive interpretation 
                                            
13 Rosenfield Law, Justice, Democracy 185. 
14 Dugard Human Rights 372. 
15 Hart 1958 Harv L Rev 593-621. 
16 Dugard Human Rights 375. 
17  The meaning that is accorded to the term enfant terrible is one whose work, thoughts 
or behaviour are seen as disturbing or embarrassing by others. 
18 Dugard Human Rights 375. 
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would appear to be more accurate and relevant. The role of judges and 
their influence on South African jurisprudence is traced from an 
examination of relevant case-law.19 The reason for effecting such a 
comparison is to identify possible factors that ought to be heeded by 
judges when applying section 39(2) in the process of interpretation. 
4 An overview of the position prior to 1994 
4.1 The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty 
Prior to the Constitution, South Africa applied the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty. According to Dicey, the concept is defined as: 
Neither more nor less than this, namely that Parliament has under the 
English Constitution the right to make or unmake any law whatsoever, and 
further that no person or body is recognised by the Law of England as 
having a right to override or set aside the Legislation of Parliament.20 
What is evident is that this doctrine was imposed on South Africa during 
the British colonial rule. Nevertheless, even though other states in Africa 
were also subjected to British rule, none had to succumb to the infamous 
and derogatory racial laws to the same extent as did South Africa. In 
accordance with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, during the 
apartheid era the South African courts in general applied mainly a strict 
literal and textual approach when interpreting the law and deciding on 
cases. Therefore, the courts were not involved in law-making as 
propounded by Dworkin's theory of "constructive interpretation", but rather 
they were limited to interpreting the text and enforcing the will of 
parliament without any scrutiny as to how fair or just the laws were. This is 
in keeping with the expression iudicis est ius dicere sed non dare, which 
means that "the duty of the judge is to apply the law, not to make it".21 
Therefore it would seem that there was little scope for judicial review and 
judicial activism by the courts. 
4.2 The effect of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty on 
South African law 
The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty has had far-reaching 
consequences on South African law. In applying the doctrine during 
apartheid, the judiciary allowed the government of the day to use it as an 
instrument to achieve its own goals. The gross infringements of human 
                                            
19 See the discussion of cases in 5.5 Cases impacting on policy issues. 
20 Dicey Introduction to the Study of Law 70. 
21 Botha Statutory Interpretation 160. 
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rights subsequently led to a loss of confidence in the judiciary during the 
apartheid era. The courts adopted a distinction between the legislature's 
function and the judiciary's function and regarded it as their duty to 
analyse and interpret the will of Parliament "but not to 'reason why'".22 The 
emphasis was on procedural fairness rather than substantive fairness. 
This view, as discussed earlier, strongly reflected the thinking of the legal 
positivists, who contended that law and morality should not overlap unless 
such morality is enforced by legislation which has been duly passed by 
parliament. Thus the role of the judge accordingly was to interpret the 
legal text and nothing more. 
In the case of Collins v Minister of the Interior,23 a famous case that was 
decided during apartheid, Centilivres CJ specifically stated that: 
If the provisions of a law are clear, we, as a court, are not concerned with the 
propriety of the legislation or policy of the legislature, our duty is to minister 
and interpret it as we find it. 
The approach referred to was also applied in many other cases,24 clearly 
left a lot to be desired, and did in fact inhibit the development of the law. It 
is argued that the very essence of judicial duty is the delivery of justice. 
However, during apartheid this was clearly compromised by the judiciary. 
The former Chief Justice Mahomed remarked that the judiciary neither has 
the power of the purse nor the sword and its power is derived from the 
esteem in which it is held within "the psyche and soul of a nation".25 
Accordingly, in order to foster public confidence in the courts, historical 
and political factors must be taken into account. This must be done with a 
forward-looking mind-set with the aim of promoting equality and freedom 
and the highly protected rights in the Bill of Rights so as to ensure that the 
process is in accordance with the values and principles enshrined in the 
Constitution. 
                                            
22 Friedman 1961 Colum L Rev 823. 
23 Collins v Minister of the Interior 1957 1 SA 552 (A) 567. 
24 Minister of Posts and Telegraphs v Rasool 1934 AD 167; Stanton v Minister of 
Justice 1964 3 SA 354 (T); S v Wood 1976 1 SA 703 AD; S v Tobias 1967 2 SA 165 
(C); S v Hjul 1964 2 SA 635 (C). 
25 Mahomed 1999 SALJ 112. 
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5 An overview of the position post 1994 
5.1 Empowerment of the judiciary 
With most African States, it has been noted that the judiciary has been 
over-shadowed by the executive and legislative branches of government.26 
This was especially so in South Africa with the system of parliamentary 
sovereignty, as has already been alluded to. The shift in emphasis from 
parliamentary sovereignty to constitutional supremacy since the early 
1990's has changed this position significantly, with the judiciary being able 
to assert its influence on the development of law and the emerging 
jurisprudence as a result of the powers derived from the Constitution. It is 
argued, however, that the empowerment of the judiciary can only be truly 
realised where the judiciary uses its powers to negate the authoritarian 
impulses of elected politicians and acts "boldly and decisively to enforce 
both the letter and the spirit of the law".27 The South African Constitution 
has been manifestly instrumental in enabling the judiciary to give effect to 
the spirit of the law, in terms of the following relevant provision. Section 228 
of the Constitution, which declares that the Constitution is the supreme law 
of the Republic of South Africa, read together with section 165,29 which 
vests judicial authority in the courts, as well as section 173,30 which 
provides for the inherent power of the courts to protect and regulate their 
own processes, theoretically allows for the courts to "act boldly and 
decisively to enforce both the letter and the spirit of the law".31 More 
relevant to the debate, however, is section 39(2) of the Constitution, which 
provides that: 
When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or 
customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
Consequently, the courts must make value judgements when engaging in 
the interpretation and application of law. Botha submits that "the courts are 
                                            
26 Quansah and Fombad 2009 http://bit.ly/24E8Ffj. 
27 Quansah and Fombad 2009 http://bit.ly/24E8Ffj. 
28 Section 2 of the Constitution provides: "The Constitution is the supreme law of the 
Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed 
by it must be fulfilled." 
29 Section 165(1) of the Constitution provides:"The judicial authority of the Republic is 
vested in the courts." 
30 Section 173 of the Constitution provides:"The Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of 
Appeal and High Court have the inherent power to protect and regulate their own 
process, and to develop the common law, taking into account the interests of 
justice." 
31  Quansah and Fombad 2009 http://bit.ly/24E8Ffj. 
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the guardians of the values underlying the Constitution".32 Therefore, in 
any matter that comes before the court, the mandate of the courts is to 
ensure that they enforce and protect the values embodied in the 
Constitution. As a result thereof there has been a noticeable paradigmatic 
shift from a literal or textual methodology to a more value-based or a 
teleological mode of interpretation. 
5.2 Application of Section 39(2) 
5.2.1  The teleological approach to interpretation 
It is evident that section 39(2) clearly mandates a more teleological or a 
value-orientated approach to the process of the interpretation of law. This 
is diametrically opposite to the literal or textual approach that was adopted 
prior to the Constitution under the parliamentary sovereignty, as has been 
explicated earlier. In the Matiso33 case which was decided under the 
Interim Constitution, Sachs J gave the following explanation of the 
teleological approach to constitutional interpretation: 
The values that must suffuse the whole process (of interpretation) are derived 
from the concept of an open and democratic society based on freedom and 
equality, several times referred to in the constitution. The notion of an open and 
democratic society is thus not merely aspirational or decorative, it is normative 
furnishing the matrix of ideals within which we work, the source from which we 
derive the principles and rules we apply, and the final measure we use for 
testing the legitimacy of impugned norms and conduct. We should not engage 
in purely formal or academic analysis, nor simply restrict ourselves to ad hoc 
technicism, but rather focus on what has been called a synergetic relation 
between the values underlying the guarantees of fundamental rights and the 
circumstances of the particular case. 
Further, in Makwanyane34 the court stated the following with regard to the 
interpretation of the provisions of the Bill of Rights: 
Whilst paying due regard to the language that has been used, the 
interpretation must be generous and purposive and give … expression to the 
underlying values of the Constitution. 
What can be ascertained from the above is that the judges have certainly 
been afforded a degree of latitude or discretion when deciding cases. This 
flexibility allows for the courts to adopt an "extrinsic method of 
interpretation" which, according to Sowell, entails the importation of 
                                            
32 Botha Statutory Interpretation 164. 
33 Coetzee v Government of the Republic of South Africa, Matiso v Commanding 
Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison 1995 10 BCLR 1382 (CC) para 46. 
34 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 9. 
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considerations deemed to be of equal value to the Constitution so as to 
decipher and give effect to the intention of the Constitution's drafters.35 
Therefore, the teleological approach does not solely focus on the purpose 
or the intention of the legislature but actually takes into account all the 
relevant deliberations that may be applied. It looks at the law as a whole 
and aspires to a higher coherence.  
This resonates with Dworkin's theory of constructive interpretation, which 
requires that judges look at the law as a whole and come to the best 
decision possible when interpreting the law. In line with the teleological 
approach and theory of constructive interpretation, the Constitutional Court 
has held that the Constitution 
must not be construed in isolation, but in its context, which includes the 
history and background to the adoption of the Constitution, [and] other 
provisions of the Constitution itself.36 
It is submitted that the teleological approach requires that judges consider 
the history of the country and the values that are embraced by the 
Constitution which have been informed by this history when interpreting 
the law. From this, the courts are then required to adopt what Du Plessis 
refers to as a "forward looking interpretation, based on what can be learnt 
from the past".37 This essentially results in judicial activism, which is a 
concept that advocates for such interpretation by the judges as reflects the 
current conditions and values of society. This concept includes 
the practice by judges of disallowing policy choices by other governmental 
officials or institutions that the Constitution does not clearly prohibit.38 
In applying the law in the manner described, judges must have regard to 
the circumstances that surrounded the adoption of the Constitution, the 
enshrined values, and must give due consideration to the social, political 
and economic factors. 
The question that arises as a consequence thereof is how this discretion is 
limited and used in such a manner to ensure that the Constitution and 
values that it upholds, as well as the doctrine of the separation of powers, 
(including the necessary checks and balances) are observed. The ensuing 
discussion attempts to address this dilemma. 
                                            
35 Sowell Judicial Activism Reconsidered 23. 
36 Soobramoney v Minister of Health KwaZulu-Natal 1998 1 SA 765 (CC). 
37 Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes 249. 
38 Graglia 1996 Harv J L & Pub Pol'y 293-296. 
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5.3 Counter majoritarian difficulty 
Where courts exercise a power to scrutinise the conformity of ordinary 
laws with constitutional imperatives, they 
define the boundary of law making authority of the legislature. This may 
involve not only striking down legislation but also developing the common law, 
thus detracting the legislature's law-making power. Both functions clash with 
the expression of the will of the majority, which is central to a democratic 
system.39 
Bickel describes this as the "counter-majoritarian difficulty" and states that 
judicial review is a counter majoritarian force (with reference to the United 
States of America), and further that "when the Supreme Court declares 
unconstitutional a legislative act it thwarts the will of representatives of the 
actual people of the here and now".40 This is a paradox, considering that 
the intentions of an elected legislature can be thwarted by a few unelected 
judicial officers. It is then clear from this that the courts in exercising this 
power would need to be cautious not to exceed or abuse their powers as 
"undue adventurism can be as damaging as excessive judicial timidity".41 
This "counter-majoritarian difficulty" would seem to be one of the more 
serious problems the courts face when they engage in judicial activism. 
The Constitutional Court in its attempts to fulfil its mandate in terms of 
section 39(2) has in a number of cases gone against the will of the 
majority and perhaps to a certain extent even risked the depreciation of 
the confidence of the public in the courts. 
Two particular cases are relevant in this regard. The first to be considered 
is the Makwanyane42 case, which was on the constitutionality of section 
277(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act,43 which allowed for the imposition of 
the death penalty for persons charged and convicted of murder. Despite 
public outcry (this included an outcry for a referendum on this issue) and 
the rising crime rate in South Africa at that time, the Constitutional Court 
declared this section unconstitutional and abolished the death penalty, 
thereby disregarding public opinion. Chief Justice Chaskalson further 
stated that "public opinion should not deter the judiciary from interpreting 
and upholding constitutional provisions without fear or favour". According 
to him, if public opinion was decisive, there would be no need for 
                                            
39 Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions (Pretoria) 2007 5 SA 30 (CC). 
40 Bickel Least Dangerous Branch 16-17. 
41 Stated by Justice Albie Sachs in Prince v President of the Law Society of the Cape 
of Good Hope 2002 2 SA 194 (CC) para 156. 
42 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 9. 
43 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
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constitutional adjudication. The other case in point is that of Fourie.44 In 
this case the Constitutional Court declared that section 30(1) of the 
Marriage Act45 was unconstitutional as it failed to recognise the right of 
gay couples to marry. Although in doing this the Court was fulfilling its 
mandate to protect fundamental rights, it brought forth a "counter-
majoritarian difficulty", as some public opposition was expressed at the 
time. 
In these two cases the Court vigorously exercised judicial activism and 
evidently unlocked its creative powers in terms of section 39(2) of the 
Constitution. The Court took into account the history of South Africa, 
inequality and the prejudicial treatment of certain groups, and reconciled 
this with the values that underlie the Constitution and the purpose and 
objectives of the Constitution thereof. There was some resistance to this 
new system and some questioning of the legitimacy of the judiciary. 
Perhaps this could have been anticipated, since for decades the judiciary 
had been inclined to be largely conservative and had subscribed to 
positivist views. The Court was seen as having perhaps taken the position 
of the law-maker and disregarded the "intentions" of the democratically 
elected parliament. However, despite this, the result has been the positive 
development of our constitutional jurisprudence and human rights 
protection. 
Although these decisions may have been met with some reservations by 
the general public, the legitimacy of the court, it is submitted, was not 
undermined. It is argued that because these decisions only aided in 
advancing and protecting human rights (especially the rights of minority 
groups) this constituted progressive judicial activism and accordingly the 
argument is that "progressive judicial activism is not fundamentally harmful 
to the legitimacy of the courts".46 Although this was in essence not 
regarded as being harmful to the legitimacy of the courts, it begs the 
question as to whether the courts were within their power in terms of 
section 39(2) to make such decisions. 
5.4 The judiciary and policy 
It seems almost inevitable that courts will make decisions that will impact 
to a greater or a lesser extent on policy. This was quite clearly illustrated in 
                                            
44 Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie; Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v Minister of 
Home Affairs 2006 1 SA 524 (CC). 
45 Marriage Act 25 of 1961. 
46 Diala 2007 http://bit.ly/1SZ17c6. 
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Makwanyane and Fourie referred to above. The very nature of judicial 
review and the concept of checks and balances require that the courts 
scrutinize the decisions made by other branches of government and what 
emanates as a result thereof is that these decisions cannot be separated 
from politics. 
Du Plessis argues that: 
A bill of rights judicialises politics because it requires the judiciary to act as 
an independent referee who keeps (party) political actors to the basic 'rules 
of the political game' enshrined in the bill of rights. This in turn calls for 
political skills on the part of the referee itself - a politicisation of the judiciary 
in other words.47 
Further, Dugard similarly argues that even if "judges may dislike making 
policy decisions", this is a "necessary part of the judicial function in any 
advanced, civilized legal system".48 The judiciary ought to also realise that 
it does make the law, although this may be so only interstitially. 
Consequently, it is involved in making policy decisions and is a part of the 
South African political process.49 Even though Dugard wrote many years 
before the adoption of the Constitution, his submissions could not be more 
relevant today. 
5.5 Cases impacting on policy issues 
What can be gleaned from an examination of case-law is that in some 
cases the Constitutional Court has indeed gone so far as to comment on 
and decide on policy issues. It has also provided guidance to other 
branches of government as to how such matters are to be dealt with. A 
good example of such a case is that of the Treatment Action Campaign.50 
In this case, the constitutionality of a programme put in place by 
government to help with the prevention of HIV transmission from mother to 
child was challenged by a non-governmental organisation. This 
programme was confined to only two areas, one in the rural areas and the 
other in an urban area. Doctors who were outside these piloted areas did 
not have access to Nevirapine, which was the preferred anti-retroviral 
drug. The High Court ordered the government to make the drug available 
to all HIV-positive mothers and children at birth. The Court further ordered 
that the government develop and put into place a comprehensive plan 
which would help prevent mother-to-child transmission. 
                                            
47 Du Plessis and De Ville 1993 Stell LR 81. 
48 Dugard Human Rights 367. 
49 Dugard Human Rights 368. 
50 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 10 BCLR 1033 (CC). 
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The Constitutional Court upheld the decision of the High Court on appeal. 
Even though the Constitutional Court agreed that the primary policy 
formulators should be the parliament and the executive, it stated that the 
courts were also mandated to make decisions that might impact or affect 
policy.51 Where policies were challenged as being inconsistent with the 
Constitution, courts would have to consider whether in implementing and 
formulating these policies the state had given effect to its constitutional 
obligations. If the Court found that the state had failed to act accordingly, it 
was under an obligation to say so.52 As much as this constituted an 
intrusion into the domain of the executive, it was an intrusion required by 
the Constitution. Further, if the government was found to be in breach of 
its obligations as required by the Constitution, it was necessary for the 
Court to provide appropriate relief to remedy the breach. In so formulating 
that relief, there was a need to ensure that constitutional rights were 
vindicated. Further, the Court would need to be attentive to both to the 
functions of the legislature and the executive under the Constitution.53 
In Grootboom54 the Court directed the government to implement a 
coordinated and comprehensive programme within its available resources 
to progressively realise the right of access to adequate housing.55 In doing 
this the Court entered the domain of the executive and made a decision 
that affected policy. This decision was clearly a deviation from the 
Soobramoney decision, where the Court refused lifesaving dialysis 
treatment to the applicant because of budgetary constraints. The 
Constitutional Court rejected the applicant's contention that this treatment 
qualified as emergency medical treatment under section 27(3)56 of the 
Constitution. In this case the Court declared that it would be slow to 
"interfere with rational decisions taken in good faith by the political 
organs".57 
However, a failure by a court to fulfil its mandate of promoting the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights by deferring to the legislature could 
potentially leave certain rights unprotected or with little protection. This can 
be especially argued for in cases where minority rights are affected. This 
was seen in the Fourie case, where the Court suspended section 30(1) of 
                                            
51 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 10 BCLR 1033 (CC). 
52 This is consistent with ss 165(2) and 7(2) of the Constitution. 
53 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 10 BCLR 1033 (CC). 
54 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC). 
55 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC). 
56 Section 27(3) of the Constitution provides that "No one may be refused emergency 
medical treatment". 
57 Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 1 SA 765 (CC). 
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the Marriage Act. This was so as to give the legislature adequate time to 
remedy the defect invalidated by the Court's judgment. However, this also 
resulted in the deferring of equality rights of same-sex couples for one 
year. The Court could have simply ordered that there be a reading in of 
the words "or spouse" to section 30(1) of the Marriage Act, and as argued 
by Justice O' Regan in her dissenting judgment, this 
would not create great uncertainty when the legislation was eventually 
amended in favour of same-sex marriages and neither would reading in 
obstruct the legislature in its policy choices.58 
Masiya also shows that the Court's deference to the legislature has the 
effect of defeating its mandate of protecting minorities. In his dissenting 
judgment, Langa CJ stated that "young boys, prisoners and homosexuals", 
who are "most often the survivors of rape, are, like women, also vulnerable 
groups in our society".59 Therefore, the refusal by the Court to extend the 
common law definition of rape to include non-consensual male-on-male 
penetrative sex arguably constituted a failure to fulfil its mandate and role 
as the guardian of the Constitution. Justice Susan Kenny from Australia 
states that 
As trustees of the law, the judiciary administers the law not for its own 
benefit but for the benefit of each and every member of the community. The 
public, then, is the whole community - which at times may not be 
represented by the majority or the media.60 
It is submitted that in these cases the Court did not adequately protect the 
minorities, who are represented by neither the public nor the media. 
Therefore, where the judges are faced with such hard cases there must be 
a consideration of minority rights and how these may be affected by the 
relevant policies or laws. This is because these minorities are usually not 
well represented in the relevant decision-making forums and are therefore 
essentially disempowered. However, their fundamental rights must still be 
protected. 
In cases where the courts declare any legislation unconstitutional and 
subsequently invalidate such legislation in a bid to protect certain rights, 
courts should then employ modificative interpretation without reluctance, 
unless that would impose an unnecessary burden on government or 
grossly interfere with existing laws. Further, the court should also make an 
                                            
58 Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie; Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v Minister of 
Home Affairs 2006 1 SA 524 (CC). 
59 Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions (Pretoria) 2007 5 SA 30 (CC) 86. 
60 Kenny 1999 Monash U L Rev 210. 
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assessment as to whether there is a less intrusive manner of deciding the 
matter, taking into consideration the doctrine of the separation of powers. 
Modificative interpretation allows for the adoption of an interpretation that 
modifies the meaning of certain legislation. This would aid in not leaving 
rights unprotected or a lacuna in the law as a result of deference by the 
courts. This can be done through: 
1. reading in, which entails reading words into a provision so as to 
make it constitutional;  
2. reading down, which is a more restrictive method of interpretation 
allowing the courts to adopt an interpretation that will be deemed to 
be constitutional where legislation is unconstitutional at face value 
but is capable of being interpreted in a constitutional manner;  
3. finally, severance, which involves the elimination of an offending part 
of a provision so as to render it constitutional and valid.61 
In all this, a certain balance needs to be struck in matters involving the 
constitutionality of legislation or policies. Criticisms of judicial activism 
have resulted in the judiciary, as we have seen in some instances, being 
extremely sensitive to the thin boundary between exercising those powers 
which they have been constitutionally mandated to exercise and legislating 
from the bench. Justice O'Regan in Bertie Van Zyl62 cited a passage from 
the Court's judgment in Hyundai: 
On the one hand, it is the duty of a judicial officer to interpret legislation in 
conformity with the Constitution so far as this is reasonably possible. On the 
other hand, the legislature is under a duty to pass legislation that is reasonably 
clear and precise, enabling citizens and officials to understand what is expected 
of them. A balance will have to be struck as to how this tension is to be resolved 
when considering the constitutionality of legislation.63 
Judicial duty demands the delivery of justice. In the South African context, 
it is submitted that such justice can be achieved through the correct 
methodology of interpretation, which has been identified as a value-
activating or teleological method of interpretation. This methodology 
should inform the way we interpret legislation and the Constitution with the 
values that it epitomises in a constitutional democracy. The correct 
interpretation of section 39(2) of the Constitution mandates that the courts 
                                            
61 Botha Statutory Interpretation 195-197. 
62 Bertie Van Zyl (Pty) Ltd v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 10 BCLR 978 (CC). 
63 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors 
(Pty) Ltd: In Re: Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit 2000 10 BCLR 1079 
(CC). 
A SINGH & MZ BHERO  PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  17 
are to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. This, it is 
argued, is a cue for the courts to engage in judicial activism, but only for 
as long as it protects or promotes the rights contained in the Bill of Rights. 
Judges do not have an unlimited discretion, but one that is likened to the 
hole at the centre of a doughnut by Dworkin.64 It is one that can be applied 
only if the surrounding belt of restriction65 is taken cognisance of. 
6 Conclusion 
Engaging in judicial activism can be controversial and can strain the 
relations between the judiciary and other branches of the government. 
However, Du Plessis and Wesson state that all 
these challenges and controversies should be considered with the 
realisation that in all democracies in which the judiciary is empowered to 
review and set aside government conduct, policies and laws, the judiciary 
invariably shares at times, a tense relationship with the other branches of 
government.66 
Although judicial activism may appear to be contrary to the doctrine of the 
separation of powers, it is an important part of judicial review. Judicial 
review is consistent with the checks and balances mechanism, which is an 
element of the doctrine of the separation of powers. Judicial activism could 
therefore be viewed as a way of ensuring that the exercise of power by 
other branches of government does not go unchecked. 
It is appreciated that the excessive exercise of judicial activism might 
result in the judiciary's overstepping boundaries and fully taking on the 
roles of the policy and law makers, and thereby hindering the executive 
from effectively implementing its policies and the legislature from fulfilling 
its function of law-making. It is suggested that the courts should then 
formulate a test that could assist the courts in determining whether a case 
is one that requires it to engage in judicial activism. The courts could 
perhaps take the following factors into account when deciding whether or 
not to engage in judicial activism: 
1. The nature of the right. This entails taking into consideration whether 
such rights are strongly protected by the Constitution, for example, 
equality, access to courts, just administrative action or dignity. If so, 
                                            
64 Johnson, Pete and Du Plessis Jurisprudence 119. 
65 The restrictions on this discretion in the South African context are the values, 
purport, object and spirit of the Constitution. 
66 Wesson and Du Plessis 2005 http://bit.ly/21Lz2L5. 
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then the court, as the guardian of the Constitution, must take all the 
necessary measures to protect such rights. 
2. Whether the issue involves consideration of social, economic or 
political factors and if so, to what extent. Where an issue is likely to 
have grossly adverse implications on these factors then the courts 
should lean towards engaging in activism so as to remedy the 
situation and prevent such an effect. It is apparent in our discussion 
that this factor was a key consideration in the Grootboom and 
Treatment Action Campaign cases. 
3. Whether a minority group is adversely affected. Considering, minority 
groups are not adequately represented in the relevant decision 
making institutions, the courts should take this factor into 
consideration so as to protect such minorities. This position was 
adopted and applied in respect of the Fourie case discussed above. 
4. Whether the failure to decide on such a matter would result in a 
gross injustice and/or leave certain rights unprotected. Where there 
is the possibility of a gross injustice or a chance that certain 
fundamental rights might be left unprotected, then the court should 
take this as a factor weighing in favour of engaging in judicial 
activism. It is quite evident from the Masiya case, which is discussed 
above, that this is a factor that the courts need to seriously consider. 
5. Whether there is a less intrusive manner of protecting such rights 
whilst still observing the doctrine of the separation of powers. Where 
there are less intrusive ways of enforcing or protecting rights, then 
the court should adopt those. Failure to do this would result in an 
abuse of the Court's power of judicial review and the arbitrary 
adoption of judicial activism. 
In conclusion, what is evident is that it is crucial for the development of our 
constitutional democracy that the courts engage in judicial activism. 
Further, such powers are granted to the judges in terms of section 39(2) of 
the Constitution. The application of section 39(2) has resulted in a new 
value-based jurisprudence, as opposed to the legal positivism that 
prevailed prior to the Constitution. This is akin to natural law. As such, 
judges must unlock the creative powers granted to them in the 
Constitution and should consider the aforementioned factors before 
making decisions that will affect other branches of government. It is 
submitted that a consideration of the factors highlighted above is not only 
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relevant in the process of judicial law-making, but is what is expected of 
judges in unlocking the creative powers encapsulated in section 39(2). 
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